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Data fraudLinguistic category priming is a novel paradigm to examine automatic influences of language on cognition
(Semin, 2008). An initial article reported that priming abstract linguistic categories (adjectives) led tomore glob-
al perceptual processing,whereas priming concrete linguistic categories (verbs) led tomore local perceptual pro-
cessing (Stapel & Semin, 2007). However, this report was compromised by data fabrication by the first author, so
that it remains unclear whether or not linguistic category priming influences perceptual processing. To fill this
gap in the literature, the present article reports 12 studies among Dutch and US samples examining the percep-
tual effects of linguistic category priming. The results yielded no evidence of linguistic category priming effects.
These findings are discussed in relation to other research showing cultural variations in linguistic category prim-
ing effects (IJzerman, Saddlemyer, & Koole, 2014). The authors conclude by highlighting the importance of
conducting and publishing replication research for achieving scientific progress.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Linguistic relativity refers to the idea that language shapes, or even
determines, the way its speakers view the world (Sapir & Swadesh,
1946; Von Humboldt, 1843; Whorf, 1956). In its most radical form, lin-
guistic relativity implies that language can be equated with thought.
This extreme version of linguistic relativity has been clearly refuted by
empirical observations (for discussions, see Gumpertz & Levinson,
1996; Pinker, 1994). Nevertheless, weaker forms of linguistic relativity
may still apply, in which language influences (rather than fully deter-
mines) thought (Boroditsky, 2003; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003;
Winawer et al., 2007). For instance, speakers of different languages are1105, Amsterdam1081HV, The
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. This is an open access article underable to perceive the same elementary colors of the spectrum, but having
separate linguistic terms for perceptually close colors (e.g., different
shades of blue) does allow speakers to differentiate such colors more
easily (Winawer et al., 2007). Likewise, language may determine
whether speakers use a relative frame of reference (to the left or right
of, used by most English speakers) or an absolute frame of reference
(north-west-south-east, Brown & Levinson, 1993; Majid, Bowerman,
Kita, Haun, & Levinson, 2004) to orient themselves. Furthermore, lan-
guagemay shapewhether people ground their sense of time in distance
metaphors (e.g., “the time that lies ahead”) or in volume metaphors
(e.g., “oceans of time”; e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; for an overview, see,
Casasanto, 2008). In sum, although language cannot be equated with
thought, a weaker form of linguistic relativity is still likely to be valid,
such that language influences thought.
A recent development in linguistic relativity research has been the
introduction of the linguistic category priming paradigm (Semin,
2008). Specific linguistic terms are recurrently paired with specific situ-
ations (Casasanto, 2008). As a result, linguistic terms may form associa-
tive links with cognitive processes. Because these associative links are
stored in memory, they may be activated or “primed”whenever people
encounter the relevant linguistic terms. One relevant dimension in this
regard is linguistic abstraction. People can represent actions at different
levels of linguistic abstraction (Semin & Fiedler, 1988; see also Semin,the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Peter”) than the same action that is described by an adjective (“Harry
is aggressive”).5 Because abstract information is more general, it may be
associated with global perceptions, whereas concrete information may
becomewith local perceptions (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007). Con-
sequently, priming verbmay elicit a focus on local details (i.e., the trees),
while priming adjectives may elicit a focus on the global whole (i.e., the
forest).
Stapel and Semin (2007) reported four experiments using the
linguistic category priming paradigm that confirmed the predicted ef-
fects of the different linguistic categories (verbs versus adjectives) on
perceptual focus. Unfortunately, it later turned out that Stapel had fab-
ricated the data (see Levelt Committee, Noort Committee & Drenth
Committee, 2012; note than Semin was unaware of Stapel's deception).
Although this turn of events was deeply disturbing, fabricated data can-
not speak to the true scientific validity (or invalidity) of a paradigm.
Thus, priming linguistic categories may still have genuine and theoreti-
cally meaningful effects. Because the paradigm may yet contribute to
the linguistic relativity debate, it remains important to investigate the
effects of linguistic category priming.
Before Stapel was exposed, three of the present authors (IJzerman,
Saddlemyer, and Koole, IJSK) were preparing a report of studies on
the effects of priming different linguistic categories among Brazilian
participants in 2009 (effects that are still subject to further investiga-
tion), for which they had planned to use Stapel and Semin's (2007)
data for cross-cultural comparison.6 Due to the invalidation of the
Stapel and Semin report, the original plan of IJSK was no longer feasi-
ble. However, IJSK learned that Regenberg had conducted nine close
and conceptual “replications” in the Netherlands between 2007 and
2009 (see Brandt et al., 2014, on the distinction between close and con-
ceptual replication). As noted, the part of this paper based on Nina
Regenberg's research was conducted under the supervision of Gün R.
Semin. After approximately 2 years of fruitless attempts to replicate
and extend what was reported by Stapel and Semin (2007) this project
was aborted. Gün R. Semin has no objections that this work is being
used in the current publication (personal communication). In addition,
IJzerman ran three experiments himself. Together, Regenberg and
IJzerman conducted twelve studies using the linguistic category para-
digm. Because these experiments represent the first genuine empir-
ical research on this paradigm, they seem worthy of publication in
their own right. We therefore report these twelve experiments
here. The experiments provide a systematic series of empirical
tests of the hypotheses Stapel and Semin (2007) had originally pur-
ported to test. Instead of discussing each experiments in detail, the
present article provides a global outline of the main parameters
that we varied in implementing linguistic category priming para-
digm. In addition, we provide a meta-analytic summary of the re-
sults in this report. We refer readers who are interested in fuller
study descriptions and results to our Open Science Framework
webpage (https://osf.io/f3kdu/).75 Beyond the descriptive action verb, Semin and associates have also distinguished be-
tween interpretative/State Action Verbs and State Verbs. We focus on the distinction be-
tween DAVs and ADJs here because they constitute the two extremes and are hence
most relevant for the discussion on concrete and abstract language. Moreover, research
on linguistic category priming has so far mainly been concerned with the comparison be-
tween verbs and adjectives.
6 Despite repeated requests from the present authors during 2008–2010, Stapel did not
provide the data from Stapel and Semin (2007).
7 Due to this data being collected several years ago, and our general expectation thatwe
would be unable to report these studies, not all of the study materials have been retained.
We have included the materials of the only study that was conducted in English on our
webpage at the Open Science Framework.2. Methods
2.1. Overview
The general idea behind the LCP paradigm is that participants
are primed with different linguistic categories, which is followed by
assessments of different manifestations of perceptual focus. These as-
sessments were based on the assumption that priming abstract linguis-
tic categories (adjectives) should lead to a more abstract perceptual
focus, whereas concrete linguistic categories (action verbs) should
lead to a more concrete perceptual focus. In the following paragraphs,
we lay out the various ways in which we primed linguistic categories
and how we measured perceptual focus.
2.2. Priming
Our most frequent method of priming linguistic categories was
the scrambled sentence task (our Experiments 1–3, 6–9, 10–12). In
this procedure, participants are typically given a jumble of words
with which they were asked to construct a meaningful sentence
(see our OSF page for a relevant example). By varying the contents
of these word assortments, it is possible to prime participants with
different linguistic categories. Thus, in the adjective condition, the
word groups mostly contained adjectives (e.g., “aggressive,” “friend-
ly,” “humble”). In the verb condition, these word groups mostly
contained action verbs (e.g., “punch,” “help,” “swim”). The verb and
adjective conditions both also contained neutral word groups as
fillers.
A second priming method that we used was to ask participants to
read priming sentences on a screen (our Experiments 4 and 5). Final-
ly, a third method we employed was a subliminal priming task (our
Experiment 8). In the latter procedure, participants were shown
words from different linguistic categories (depending on condition)
in alternating corners of the screen for a period of 60 ms, followed
by a 60 ms mask.
2.3. Measurements
To measure perceptual processes, a first method we used was the
framed line task (our Experiments 1, 2, and 3). In this task, participants
were shown a box with a line of varying length suspended from the top
edge (located half-way through the square). In the original variation of
the task, participants are shown a second square of different dimensions
(without the line) and are asked to recreate either the length of the first
line (independent of the square), or recreate the line in proportion to
the square (see, e.g., Fig. 1; Kitayama et al., 2003). In our experiments,
we used only the absolute task. Thus, we could determine whether
participants primed with different linguistic categories were prone to
integrate irrelevant spatial information (the square) into their line judg-
ments. Based on Stapel and Semin's (2007) predictions, we predicted
that priming adjectives would promote holistic perception and lead
people tomakemore errors by incorporating the irrelevant information
from the square. Conversely, priming verbs should activate a more con-
crete, detailed mindset, leading to better performance on the absolute
version of the framed line task.88 In our Experiment, 3 we also measured similarity, attractiveness, height, age, and
weight of in- and out-groups. We report the results of any auxiliary analyses on our
webpage at the Open Science Framework.
Fig. 1. Example of the framed line task. Participantswere showna square framewith a ver-
tical line and asked to draw a line in a new square of the same or different size. The line
was to be drawn so that it was identical to the first line in absolute length (absolute
task) or so that the proportion between the length of the line and the height of its frame
was identical to the proportion between the line and frame in the original stimulus (rela-
tive task; taken from Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003).
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Kimchi and Palmer (1982; see IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Schilder,
IJzerman, & Denissen, 2014; our Experiments 4, 5, and 11). This task
consisted of a target object, which participants had to compare to two
alternative figures and judgewhich figure they found to bemost similar
to the target (see e.g., Fig. 2). Like with the framed line task, one couldFig. 2. Example of an item used in the perceptual focus task modelled after Kimchi and
Palmer. The target object (in Dutch “doelobject”) is a triangle (pattern) consisting of
three squares. From the line of reasoning presented in this paper, Figure A represents
the global perspective (same pattern), while Figure B represents the local perspective
(same individual properties).expect those primed with verbs to have a more local perceptual
focus, and thus to focus on independent properties of the images. Two
other tasks we used to test our hypothesis are the Stroop task (our Ex-
periments 6, 7, and 8), the Flanker task (Experiment 9), and the catego-
rization task (our Experiments 10 and 12). In the former, participants
were presentedwith color nameswith either incongruent or congruent
font colors. By examining how participants perform on incongruent tri-
als, one can infer “Stroop interference”; that is, how irrelevant informa-
tion contained in the text influences responses. Based on Stapel and
Semin's (2007) ideas, we expected that priming participants with
verbs (vs. adjectives) would lead to greater Stroop interference (a com-
parable line of reasoningwould go for the Flanker task). In the latter ex-
periment, we examine categorization by presenting participants with
an item (i.e., a camel) and a category (i.e., a vehicle) and asking partici-
pants to indicate on a seven point scale how much they think the item
belongs in the category. Using the examples provided in the brackets,
one would expect that, priming with adjectives, at an abstract level, a
camel could be construed as a vehicle, whereas this may less frequently
be judged as such if the participant was primedwith a verb (andwould
have a concrete focus).
3. Results
For ease of interpretation, we conducted a random-effects meta-
analysis using the metaphor package in R (Viechtbauer, 2010) on our
results in order to determine any effect of linguistic category priming
across our between-subjects linguistic priming studies (see Table A1
for details of the methods). The average estimated standardized mean
difference was not significant (Cohen's d CI = 95–0.1603 0.2185, p =
.76). The test for heterogeneity again was not significant (Q = 10.42,
p = .24), which indicates that studies were comparable across depen-
dent variables. Our 9 between-subjects studies examining the same ef-
fects of linguistic category priming amongst Dutch and American
participants thus failed to demonstrate any traces of an effect (for our
forest plot, see Fig. 3).
4. Discussion
I confabulated research and reported it. Colleagues and journal edi-
tors reviewed it critically. They published my work, and later it turned
out that researchers in another city and in another country had done
similar research. They had found the same results. My confabulated
study was replicated. What appeared logical to me and what purely
existed in my imagination turned out to be true.
In his autobiography Derailment (2012, p. 177), Stapel attributed
some uncanny powers to himself. According to Stapel, his fabricated
“studies” were replicated in actual experiments by other researchers.
Thus, merely concocting a plausible-sounding finding was sufficient
for the finding to become confirmed by experimental research. Stapel's
magical view of psychological science is strongly refuted by our twelve
studies on linguistic category priming. Most of these studies were con-
ducted before Stapel was exposed, when we ourselves were still con-
vinced of the validity of the linguistic category priming effects
reported by Stapel and Semin (2007). Nevertheless, the data proved
us wrong: Our twelve studies, considered singly or in combination,
yielded no evidence that linguistic category priming influences percep-
tual processing. (Indeed, the one significant effect that we observedwas
in the opposite direction of the proposed hypothesis.) The present re-
search is thus a potent reminder that the outcomes of experimental psy-
chology are grounded in empirical reality, no matter what researchers
might expect or hope to find.
Many of the replication studies that are described in this article
were conducted between 2007 and 2009 by Regenberg, who consis-
tently found null effects. At the time, these disconfirmatory findings
were seen as “failed studies” that were not worthy of publication. In
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Fig. 3. Forest-plot of the between subjects studies in our paper. The model's effect size is a Cohen's d (with a CI 95 displayed for the model and for each study).
26 H. IJzerman et al. / Acta Psychologica 157 (2015) 23–29manner has hindered scientific progress. The present research thus
constitutes a further argument for systematically conducting and
reporting replication studies (see Brandt et al., 2014; IJzerman,
Brandt, & van Wolferen, 2013; Klein et al., 2014; Koole & Lakens,
2012). Publishing replication research, pre-registration, and archiving
the data all contribute toward reducing redundancy in research ef-
forts across different labs and to uncovering important contextual
variations in empirical phenomena (for examples, see Schilder et al.,
2014; Ong, IJzerman, & Leung, 2014).
The present findings, combined with Stapel's data fraud, might be
seen as the deathblow to the linguistic category priming paradigm,
given that our data suggest that verb or adjective priming does not
influence perceptual focus. However, in our view, discarding the
whole idea of linguistic category priming would be throwing out
the baby with the bathwater. One potential moderator for the usage
of language is culture: We have recently proposed an alternative
model of language use, which holds that verbs—in specific cultures—
are more associated with relational processing than adjectives
(IJzerman, Saddlemyer, & Koole, 2014). According to this model,
priming linguistic categories may well have consequences on people's
perceptions, albeit in a different manner than was previously sug-
gested by linguistic researchers (Semin, 2008). Our relational model
of language use has so far been supported by a number of studies
that we have collected amongst Brazilian participants. We have
plans to further investigate these effects. Together with the present
work, this alternative model of language use further suggests that
perceptual effects of linguistic primes may differ meaningfully be-
tween countries and contexts.
If our foregoing considerations are valid, then the present studies
highlight the need for a more sophisticated understanding of contex-
tual influences on social-cognitive priming effects. From a situatedcognition perspective, several scholars have suggested that most
social-cognitive priming effects do not exist as main effects but rather
interact with people's goals, embodied states, and the specific situa-
tions people find themselves in (e.g., Smith & Semin, 2004; IJzerman
& Koole, 2011). Consequently, it remains to be seen whether the ef-
fect we have investigated does not exist, or whether it depends on
identifying the right contexts and measurements for the linguistic
category priming effects among Western samples (Cesario & Jonas,
2014).
Linguistic category priming may thus have significant influences on
perception, even though these influences are likely to be highly com-
plex and shaped by cultural (and/or linguistic) and situational con-
straints. This complexity and context sensitivity is consistent with a
weak version of linguistic relativity, which posits that language is condi-
tioned by (perceptual) experiences and hence should be reliant on cul-
tural and situational constraints. Studying language and psychological
processes in this way will initially require extra investments of time
and resources, but the scientific benefits are sure to accumulate in
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Here we report all the methods and inferential statistics. Standardized means and standard deviations are presented.
Study Sample Procedure DVs Results
Experiment 1
(SS Study 1)
N = 37, 56.8% female Participants completed the scrambled
sentence task on the computer. They
then completed the framed line task
(absolute version) on the computer
and a ten statements task on paper.
The order of these two tasks was
counterbalanced.
Framed line task (absolute).
DV: error score between drawn and
correct line length
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
lower scores on the absolute task
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized and reversed (thus,
verbs expected to have higher scores)
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and verb priming




N = 69, 65.2% female Participants completed the scrambled
sentence task on paper. They then
completed the framed line task
(absolute and relative version, order
counterbalanced) on the computer
and a ten statements task on paper.
The order of these two tasks was
counterbalanced.
Framed line task (absolute).
DV: error score between drawn and
correct line length for both tasks
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
lower scores on the absolute task
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized and reversed (thus,
verbs expected with higher scores).
We only included absolute scores in
MA.
Expectation: Adjective priming leads
to lower scores on the relative task
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and action verb
priming conditions; t(67) = − .24,
p = .81 on absolute error scores.
(An independent-samples t-test
revealed a marginally significant
difference between adjective and
action verb priming conditions;




N = 50, 64% female Participants completed the scrambled
sentence task on paper. They then
made judgments of how close two
displayed individuals seemed to each
other and rated them individually on
the features attractiveness, height,
weight, and age. After a surprise recall
of the scrambled sentence task items,
participants completed the framed
line task (absolute version) on the
computer.
Framed line task (absolute).
DV: error score between drawn and
correct line length
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
lower scores on the absolute task
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized and reversed (thus,
verbs expected to have higher scores)
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and action verb
priming conditions; t(48) = .62,
p= .54 on absolute error scores.
Experiment 4
(SS Study 1)
N = 24, 68.2% female Participants received an in-group
priming. Participants, all students of
VU University, wrote down five
stereotypic traits of VU and of UvA
(competing university) students. They
then went on to a modified perceptual
focus task. Before each trial they read a
sentence on the screen. These were
designed to either contain a verb or an
adjective (language abstraction) and
they described a positive or a negative
behavior/trait (valence), which was
congruent with the respective
stereotype. There were four blocks of
24 trials. The perceptual focus task
trials were identical in each block, but
there were 120 unique sentences.
Pop-up multiple choice questions
about the sentences were included to
insure that participants properly read
them and between the blocks
participants solved two math
problems.
Perceptual focus task
DV: choice for global vs. local option
(coding: local = 1, global = 0, thus
the DV represents the amount of
locality)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
higher scores on the perceptual focus
task
Meta-analysis approach: Given design
was substantially different (repeated
measures, and interactions), we
omitted this study from the
meta-analysis.
A 2 (language abstraction) × 2
(in-group/out-group) × 2 (valence)
repeated measures revealed no
significant main effect of language on




N = 27, 63 % female Same as in Experiment 4 except that a
response window was introduced for
reading the sentences.
Perceptual focus task
DV: choice for global vs. local option
(same as in Experiment 4)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
higher scores on the perceptual focus
task
Meta-analysis approach: Given that
the design was substantially different
(within design), we omitted this study
from the meta-analysis
A 2 (language abstraction) × 2
(in-group/out-group) × 2 (valence)
repeated measures revealed no
significant main effect of language on





N = 61 (7 excluded for color
blindness), 70.4% female. For this
paper, we conducted analyses
conducted on participants in
adjectives and action verb
conditions (N = 34)
Participants completed an SST,
priming language abstraction in three
conditions: ADJ, SV, and DAV. They
then proceeded to a Stroop task
consisting of five blocks of 30 trials
each (10 congruent, 10 neutral, 10
incongruent): A fixation cross
Stroop task
DV: Stroop interference on reaction
times of correct responses (difference
between incongruent and neutral
trials, analysis on RT means within 2
SD of respective condition mean of
correct responses)
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and action verb
priming conditions; t(32) = − .796,
p = .43 on reaction times.
(continued on next page)
Table A1 (continued)
Study Sample Procedure DVs Results
appeared in the middle of the screen
for 1 second, followed by either the
word “blue,” the word “red,” or a row
of x's (XXXXX), which were either
written in red or blue. Participants'
task was to indicate the word's color
(not its meaning) by pressing a button
with their left or right hand,
respectively.
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
greater Stroop interference





N = 48 (7 excluded for color
blindness), 73.2% female
Participants completed a scrambled
sentence task priming language
abstraction in two conditions:
adjectives and action verbs. They then
proceeded to a paper-and-pencil ten
statements task (not reported).
Afterward, participants received a
surprise recall task about the
scrambled sentence task and then
performed the Stroop task as in
Experiment 6.
Stroop task
DV: Stroop interference on reaction
times of correct responses (analysis on
means within 2 SD of respective
condition mean of correct responses)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
greater Stroop interference
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized
An independent-samples t-test
revealed a significant difference
between adjective and action verb
priming conditions; t(39) = 2.70,
p = .010 on reaction times (counter
to the expected direction).
Experiment 8
(Study 4)
N = 48, 62.5% female Participants received a subliminal
language priming: A fixation cross was
continuously shown in the middle of
the screen. In a varying interval of 2 to
7 seconds, words were shown in one
of the four corners of the screen for 60
ms, immediately followed by a mask
(“xqfbzrmqwgbx”) for another 60 ms.
Participants then had to indicate
whether the “flash” they saw appeared
at the left or at the right side of the
screen. Then the next trial started. For
half of the participants, the prime
words consisted of 40 adjectives and 20
neutral filler items (e.g., table, chair).
The other half of the participants was
presented with 40 action verbs and 20
neutral filler items. Subsequently,
participants performed the Stroop task
as in Experiment 6.
Stroop task
DV: Stroop interference on reaction
times of correct responses (analysis on
means within 2 SD of respective
condition mean of correct responses)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
greater Stroop interference
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized.
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and action verb
priming conditions; t(46) = −1.378,




N = 27, 81.5% female Participants completed a scrambled
sentence task priming language
abstraction in two conditions:
adjectives and action verbs. They then
proceeded to a flanker task. On each
trial, participants saw a row of five
arrows or five lines. They had to
respond to the middle arrow by
pressing one of two buttons to
indicate in which direction the arrow
was pointing. The flanking arrows,
two on each side, all pointed in the
same direction which was either
congruent or incongruent with the
response stimulus. On a third type of
trials the flanking stimuli were neutral
lines without an implied direction.
Furthermore, the row of stimuli
appeared in one of three vertical
locations: at the top, the center or the
bottom of the screen. Participants did
12 neutral, 12 congruent, and 12
incongruent trials.
Flanker task
DV: reaction times of correct
responses (analysis on means within
2 SD of respective condition mean of
correct responses)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
greater interference
Meta-analysis approach: Given that
the design was substantially different
(within design), we omitted this study
from the meta-analysis..
A 2 (language abstraction, between) ×
2 (trial type, within) × 3 (position,
within) repeated measures revealed a
marginally significant main effect of
language on flanker task performance,
(F(1,25) = 3.48, p = .074).
However, none of the interactions
with trial type or position were




N = 91, 41.8% female Participants completed an adjusted
scrambled sentence task (SST)
priming language abstraction in two
conditions: adjectives and action
verbs. They then proceeded to a
category inclusion task. They had to
indicate how representative they
perceived a particular item to be of a
category on a slider from definitely
does not belong to this category to
definitely belongs to this category.
Inclusiveness of categorization
DV: Inclusiveness of categorization
(greater inclusiveness equates to
more global perceptual focus)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
lower inclusiveness scores
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized and reversed (thus,
verbs expected to have higher scores)
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and verb priming
conditions; t(89) = − .168, p = .867
on inclusiveness of categorization.
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Table A1 (continued)




N = 52, 75% female Participants completed a scrambled
sentence task priming language
abstraction in two conditions:
adjectives and action verbs. They then
completed a 24-trial perceptual focus
task
Perceptual focus task
DV: choice for global vs. local option
(coding was reversed, so we
standardized the dependent variable,
and calculated its negative score).
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
higher scores on the perceptual focus
task
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and verb




N = 49, 55.1% female Participants completed a scrambled
sentence task priming language
abstraction in two conditions:
adjectives and action verbs. They then
proceeded to the category inclusion
task.
Inclusiveness of categorization
DV: Inclusiveness of categorization
(greater inclusiveness equates to
more global perceptual focus)
Expectation: Verbs priming leads to
lower inclusiveness scores
Meta-analysis approach: Scores were
standardized and reversed (thus,
verbs expected to have higher scores)
An independent-samples t-test
revealed no significant difference
between adjective and verb
conditions, t(47) = − .52, p = .61 on
inclusiveness of categorization.
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